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CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE,
STAND-ASIDES,
AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY©
BY R. BLAKE BROWN*

This article examines the substantial differences that
emerged during the nineteenth century between the law
of England, the United States, and Canada regarding
challenges for cause, stand-asides, and peremptory
challenges in the jury selection process. The author
argues that these differences stemmed from the unique
social conditions of each country. The emergence of
legal formalism-with its emphasis on certainty and
predictability in the law-affected the development of
jury challenges, though the result of formalist thinking
had very different effects in all three jurisdictions. In
addition, Canadian law regarding jury challenges
reveals the influence of both American and English
legal trends.

Cet article examine les diff rences substantielles en
mati~re de la r cusation pour cause, la mise a l'cart et
la rdcusation pdremptoire dans la s6lection du jury qui
sont apparues pendant le dix-neuvi~me si&cle dans le
droit de rAngleterre, des ttats-Unis et du Canada.
L'auteur fait valoir que ces differences r6sultent des
conditions sociales propres a chaque pays. L'apparence
d'un formalisme juridique-avec l'emphase sur la
certitude et la pr6visibilit6 dans le droit-a influ6 le
d6veloppement de la r6cusation du jury malgr6 le fait
qu'une id6ologie formaliste a eu des r~sultats tr;s
diffdrents dans chacune des trois juridictions. De plus,
le droit canadien en matire de r6cusation du jury fair
voir lPinfluence des d6veloppements amricains et
britanniques.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of jury challenges has recently gained increased
prominence in Canada. In R v. Parks,1the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that potential jurors could be asked whether the fact that the accused
was a Black Jamaican immigrant would affect their ability to decide the
case without bias. In R. v. Bain,2 the Supreme Court of Canada struck
down as unconstitutional the Criminal Code provision permitting the
Crown to stand-aside jurors. In R. v. Williams,3 the Supreme Court
considered whether the defendant could inquire into whether jurors
might be racially biased against Aboriginal Canadians. In making these
decisions, Canadian courts have shifted Canadian jury selection practices
toward American forms of criminal procedure. Interestingly, however,
courts have made these important decisions with relatively little
knowledge of the forces that led to the divergence of challenging laws in
Canada, England, and the United States.
Modern legal historians have given scant attention to the
historical development of jury challenges and stand-asides. John
McEldowney's work is a useful starting point for examining the

1 (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 324 (C.A.).
2 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91.
3 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. The United States Supreme Court has recently dealt with peremptory
challenges, and American appellate courts constantly contend with challenge issues: for example,
see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The American academic literature debating the value of
challenges is extensive: for example, see C.R. Beck, "The Current State of the Peremptory
Challenge" (1998) 39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 961; J. Vyyerberg, "The Peremptory Challenge:
Substance Worth Preserving" (1994) 43 Drake L. Rev. 435; and A.W. Alsehuler, "The Supreme
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts" (1989) 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. 153.
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developments in England and Ireland, 4 particularly when combined with
E.P. Thompson's brief account of the decline of challenges in England.5
The American and Canadian literature on challenges is even more
scarce. Only a few short historical accounts found in studies concerning
modern criminal procedure illustrate the American law of challenging.
Even this poorly formed American literature, however, is superior to the
existing work on the history of Canadian challenges. The lack of inquiry
is partly explained by the difficulties of researching the role and
importance of challenges. Historical records typically note challenges
only in high-profile cases-usually involving murder or treason-that
attracted substantial attention from the community and media. Further,
available evidence often fails to record what form the challenges took,
and in some cases does not reflect whether it was the defendant or the
prosecutor who initiated the challenge. Despite these difficulties, this
article will piece together nineteenth-century developments in
challenges through an examination of statute and case law in Canada,
the United States, and England, in addition to nineteenth-century legal
treatises and practice manuals on criminal procedure.
This article begins with an exploration of nineteenth-century jury
selection practices in England and the United States, and proceeds to
explain their influence on Canadian developments. It focuses, in
particular, on the changing law of criminal procedure concerning 1)
challenges for cause, 2) peremptory challenges, and 3) stand-asides.
Three themes emerge from the examination of nineteenth-century
developments in the law of challenges. First, the unique social conditions
in the United States, England, and Canada affected each country's
challenging laws. In England, a bench concerned about class unrest
prevented the ancient custom of jury challenges from expanding in the
early nineteenth century. Judges precluded potential jurors who had a
relationship with one of the litigants from sitting on juries, and
prevented jurors from being asked about their personal views. Similarly,
Canadian developments concerning jury selection procedures hint at
oligarchical desires to ensure guilty verdicts in certain cases. In
comparison, American experience with jury-packing in the years
4 See J.F. McEldowney, "'Stand By for the Crown': An Historical Analysis" [1979] Crim. L.R.
272 [hereinafter "Stand By for the Crown"]; J.F. McEldowney, "The Case of The Queen v. McKenna
(1869) and Jury Packing in Ireland" (1977) 12 Irish Jurist 339; and J.F. McEldowney, "Some

Aspects of Law and Policy in the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nineteenth-Century
Ireland" in J.F. McEldowney & P. O'Higgins, eds., Common Law Tradition: Essays in Irish Legal

History (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1990) 117 at 136-55 [hereinafter "Some Aspects of Law"].
5 See E.P. Thompson, "In Defence of the Jury" in Persons and Polemics (London: Merlin

Press, 1994) 143 [hereinafter "In Defence of the Jury"].
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preceding the War of Independence led to the establishment of broad
challenging rules that would prevent the government from packing juries
against defendants.
Second, the emergence of legal formalism in the latter half of the
nineteenth century had a very different effect on the development of jury
challenges in the United States than in England or Canada. Legal
formalism emphasized certainty and predictability in the law. Lawyers
and judges on both sides of the Atlantic who understood the law in
formalist terms targeted juries because the presumed biases of jurors
were thought to lead to unpredictable decisions. In the United States,
courts tried to stamp out bias by permitting lawyers to identify biased
jurors in voir dire and remove them through challenges. Formalism had
the opposite effect in England and Canada; preventing the investigation
of challenges hid the jury's partiality.
Third, I examine how Canadian law regarding jury challenges
reveals the influence of both American and English legal trends.
Canadian legislators demonstrated considerable awareness of American
peremptory challenge law, and several Canadian statutes of the midnineteenth century copied peremptory challenge trends in the United
States. On the other hand, while Canadian judges also indicated an
awareness of American challenges-for-cause doctrines, they refused to
give latitude to lawyers seeking to interrogate potential jurors. Thus,
nineteenth-century Canadian criminal procedure borrowed substantially
from American law in one area of challenge doctrine, but in other
aspects followed the English law that limited jury challenges. By the end
of the nineteenth century, Canadian courts accepted the English
position regarding challenges for cause without question, but the
American peremptory challenge laws imported in the earlier part of the
century remained a part of Canadian law, as they do today.
II. THE COMMON LAW TO 1800
Before discussing the doctrinal changes in jury challenges during
the nineteenth century, I will provide a basic understanding of the
criminal procedures at issue (peremptory challenges, stand-asides, and
challenges for cause) as they stood in 1800. In general, a "challenge"
was, and is, a means by which a party to a case could prevent potential
jurors from sitting on the jury. Challenges were divided into two broad
groups. A challenge to the array was a challenge to the entire panel of
summoned jurors, motivated by the perceived bias of the person
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responsible for calling the jurors, typically the sheriff. For the sake of
simplicity, this article will not discuss challenges to the array. 6
The second type of challenge was "to the poll"-that is to an
individual panel member. A limited number of challenges to the poll
were "peremptory" and did not require the challenging party to give a
reason. Peremptory challenges were generally reserved for defendants.
Prosecutors had at their disposal "stand-asides," also known as "standbys." This permitted prosecutors to ask a potential juror to stand aside
until the entire panel of jurors was called once, or "gone through." At
that point, the court again called the first potential juror who had been
stood aside, and the prosecutor was required to demonstrate a challenge
for cause. Stand-asides, unlike peremptory challenges, were only limited
by the size of the panel.
Challenges to the poll could also be "for cause"-that is, where
the opinions or personal characteristics of the juror could preempt their
membership on the jury. Challenges to the poll for cause were in turn
subdivided into "principle challenges for cause" and "challenges to the
favour." A principle challenge for cause, if proven, led to a manifest
presumption of the juror's ineligibility. The presiding judge determined
the validity of such challenges. There were four grounds of principle
challenges to the poll:
" Propterhonori respectum: When a noble person was sworn on a jury
for the trial of a commoner.
* Propterdefectum: When the potential juror was an alien, an infant,
was of old age, or lacked some other relevant qualification.
* Propteraffectum: Instances of presumed or actual partiality.
• Propterdelictum: When a juror was "infamous." For example, if a
juror had been convicted of any crime that was infamous.
The principle challenge for propter affectum was the most contentious
challenge in the nineteenth century, and will receive the most attention
in this article. The clearest example of a principle challenge for propter
affectum was kinship, although it was also a sufficient reason for
challenge if a potential juror had stated an opinion as to the trial's
proper result.
The bases of challenges to the poll for favour were similar to the
propter affectum ground of principle challenge. The issue at stake in a
6 Challenges to the array were generally less frequent than challenges to individual jurors.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 38 No. 3

challenge to the favour was whether the potential juror was altogether
indifferent about the outcome of the case. 7 However, unlike principle
challenges for cause, in which evidence of a principle challenge led to a
presumption against a juror's eligibility, challenges to the poll for favour
dictated that evidence supporting a challenge for favour would not
necessarily demonstrate a challengeable cause; rather, a potential juror's
eligibility fell to the discretion of "triers." 8 Courts appointed two triers to
determine challenges for favour. Triers were generally jurors already
under oath to hear the case, though elaborate rules existed in the
treatise literature for alterations of this basic rule if no jurors had yet
been sworn. 9
The jury's origins are clouded in mystery, but the use of juries
was generally established in England by the twelfth century. Although no
research has "focused exclusively on the use of challenges in England
before 1800, some tentative observations are nevertheless possible. It
appears that the practice existed during the early development of
English juries, though challenges were not commonly employed in the
late medieval period. 10 Jurors were drawn from the local community and
thus brought to the trial their own knowledge of the parties and events at
issue. Challenges, therefore, were not intended to limit "partiality" in
the modern American sense of having jurors without prior knowledge of
events. Rather, challenges for cause sought to prevent several
understandable situations by ensuring that jurors possessed the proper
residence and property qualifications, and did not have a relationship
with one of the parties.11
The common law permitted the accused charged with a felony
thirty-five peremptory challenges.1 2 The number of peremptories was
7 The similarity between a challenge for favour and a principal challenge based on partiality
eventually led to the decline of this distinction. For a further discussion, see infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
8 See M. Bacon, A New Abridgementof the Law, vol. 3 (Dublin: John Exshaw, 1786) at 252; and
M. Bacon,A New Abridgement of the Law (London: A. Strahan, 1832) at 552.
9 J. Chitty, A PracticalTreatiseon the CriminalLaw, vol. 1 (London: A.J. Valpy, 1816) at 549.
10 See J.G. Bellany, The Criminal Trial in Later Medieval England: Felony Before the Courts

fromn EdwardI to the Sixteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 100-01.
11 See Bacon (1832), supra note 8 at 562-63. On the property qualification of English jurors in
the eighteenth century, see D. Hay, "The Class Composition of the Palladium of Liberty: Trial
Jurors in the Eighteenth Century" in J.S. Cockburn & T.A. Green, eds., Twelve GoodMen and Trm:
The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200-1800 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988)

305.
12 See J.B. Post, "Jury Lists and Juries in the Late Fourteenth Century" in Cockburn & Green,
eds.,supra note 11, 65 at 71.

2000]

Jury Challenges in the 19th Century

decreased to twenty in the 1540s, though it was increased to thirty-five
for treason trials in 1555.13 English courts did not traditionally permit
accused charged with misdemeanours to employ peremptory
challenges. 14

By common law, the King was given the great advantage of
having an infinite number of peremptory challenges, though a 1305
statute eliminated the Crown's right to peremptorily challenge jurors by
requiring the Crown to show cause when challenging a juror.l5 Courts,
however, interpreted this statute such that the Crown was allowed to

wait until the entire panel had been gone through before showing
cause. 16 Stand-asides were thus born. A large jury pool provided the
prosecution with a more powerful method of excluding jurors than the
peremptory challenge.
The literature suggests that jury challenges were uncommon in
English courtrooms. 17 Several factors may have influenced the limited
13 Bacon (1786), supra note 8 at 264.
14 On the prohibition against peremptory challenges in misdemeanor see Trial of Nathanael
Reading, [1679] 7 Howell's State Trials 259 at 265; Chitty, supra note 9 at 535; Humphry William
Woolrych, The CriminalLaw (London: Shaw and Sons, 1862) at 154; Roger D. Moore, "Voir Dire
Examination of Jurors: The English Practise" (1927-28) 16 Geo. L.J. 438 at 448; and P. Howard,
Criminal Justice in England: A Study in Law Administration (New York: MacMillan, 1931) at
361-362.
Note that special juries were available in misdemeanor upon the application of the
prosecution or defence. Special juries were composed of jurors of a higher social rank, and
employed selection processes different than those used in ordinary felonies. Before 1825, the sheriff
and the secondary prepared a panel of forty-eight names for the special jury, and legislation did not
regulate how the special jury was chosen from this list of prospective jurors. Charges of jury packing,
however, led to 1825 legislation that instituted a system of balloting whereby forty-eight jurors were
randomly selected from a ballot box: An Act for consolidating and amending the Laws relative to
Jurors and Juries, 6 Geo. IV, c. 50, ss. 31, 32. On special juries see J.C. Oldham, "Special Juries in
England: Nineteenth Century Usage and Reform" (1987) 8 J. Legal Hist. 148; and J.C. Oldham,
"The Origins of the Special Jury" (1983) 50 U. Chicago L.R. 137.
15 33 Edw. I. stat. 4, 1305 (U.K.) 33 Edw. I, c. 1; McEldowney, "Stand By For the Crown,"
supra note 4 at 274; Bacon (1832), supra note 8 at 571-572.
16 See "Stand By for the Crown," supra note 4 at 275; Trial of Lord Grey and others, [1682] 9
Howell's State Trials 127 at 128-29; Trial of Count Coningsmark, [1682] 9 Howell's State Trials 1 at
12; Trial of Spencer Cowperand others, [1699] 13 Howell's State Trials 1105 at 1108-9; and Trial of
ChristopherLayer, [1722] 16 Howell's State Trials 93 at 134-35.
17 Post, supra note 12 at 71- 72; T.A. Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on
the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) at 133-34;
J.S. Cockburn, A History of English Assizes, 1558-1714 (Holmes Beach, Fla.: Wm. W. Grant & Sons,
1972) at 120; P.J.R. King, "'Illiterate Plebeians, Easily Misled': Jury Composition, Experience, and
Behaviour in Essex, 1735-1815," in Cockburn & Green, eds., supra note 11, 254 at 277; and J.M.
Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1986) at 340. But see A. Musson, "Twelve Good Men and True? The Character of Early
Fourteenth-Century Juries" (1997) 15 L. & Hist. Rev. 115 at 133.
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use of jury challenges. First, as England urbanized, the likelihood that a

person with whom the accused had a relationship would be called to sit
on his or her jury decreased, and, thus, so did the use of challenges.
Second, the average criminal trial in the eighteenth century took
approximately thirty minutes to complete. The brevity of the
proceedings undoubtedly worked against the use of jury challenges.
While parties were informed of their right to challenge by the clerk of
the court, there appears to have been an assumption that no challenge
would be issued. Third, relatively few lawyers took part in criminal trials
until the latter part of the eighteenth century.18 Lacking an advocate
schooled in the nuances of criminal law, many accused would not have
appreciated the meaning of their right to a procedural challenge, or may
have felt unwilling to exercise it in the rather disempowering
environment of the eighteenth-century English courtroom. 19 The
requirement that the accused personally had to challenge potential
jurors accentuated this feeling of disempowerment. William Hawkins
wrote only in 1724 that courts required prisoners to make all peremptory
challenges, "even in such Cases wherein he may have Counsel." 20
Fourth, the non-disclosure of the venire-the list of prospective
jurors-meant that the accused was unaware of the identity of his or her
potential jurors. Without this knowledge, the accused had difficulty in
determining before trial which panelists ought to be challenged. 21 Last,
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century law books provided detailed discussions of the
complex law pertaining to jury challenges, despite the fact that such challenges were rarely used: see
M. Hale, The History of the Pleasof the Crown, vol. 2 (London: Professional Books, 1971) at 267-77;
W. Hawkins, Pleasof the Crown, 1716-1721, vol. 2 (London: Professional Books, 1973) at 412-20;
and Bacon (1786), supra note 8 at 251-67.
18 See J.M. Beattie, "Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries" (1991) 9 L & Hist. Rev. 221 at 223-24.
19 For a description of the majestic nature of the eighteenth-century criminal assize, see D.
Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in D. Hay, P. Linebaugh & E.P. Thompson, eds.,
Albion's Fatal Tree (London: A. Lane, 1975) 17 at 26-31.
20
W. Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleasof the Crown, vol. 2. (London: Professional Books, 1973)
at 413 (1724).
21 See J.H. Langbein, "The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at
Common Law" (1994) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047 at 1058, n. 51. Important differences existed between
treason trials and ordinary felony trials on this issue. Following the political turmoil in England
during the seventeenth century, there was a general perception that English state trials had become
unfair to the accused. TheAct for regulatingthe Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprison of Treason,
1696 (U.K.), 7 & 8 Gul., c. 3 [hereinafter Treason Act) recognized this, and thus section 1 of the
TreasonAct permitted the accused to retain counsel in treason trials. Section 7 of the Treason Act
also ensured the disclosure of the venire to the defendant, and thus gave the accused a better
opportunity to challenge potential jurors. For a discussion of the Treason Act, see S. Rezneck, "The
Statute of 1696: A Pioneer Measure in the Reform of Judicial Procedure in England" (1930) 2 J.
Mod. Hist. 5; and J.R. Phifer, "Law, Politics, and Violence: The Treason Trials Act of 1696" (1980)
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John Langbein writes that challenges were uncommon prior to 1800
because of the social standing of most jurors vis-a-vis the accused; thus,
"the exercise of challenge rights by the ordinary felony defendant was
regarded as an affront to the challenged jurors, who were commonly the
the defendant understood that he
social superiors of the accused, and ...
ought not to risk offending the remaining jurors by striking some of their
peers." 22
There appears to have been some flexibility to the procedure for
challenging jurors, though eighteenth-century law books suggest some
general rules of practice. The court conducted challenges when a full
jury panel was assembled but before jurors were sworn. 23 The defendant
could bring a peremptory challenge or a challenge for cause, and if a
prospective juror was unsuccessfully challenged for cause, the accused
could subsequently challenge peremptorily. If the issue before the court
was a challenge to the favour, the court appointed two triers to consider
the challenged juror's indifference. 24 A challenge to the poll could be
demonstrated in two ways. One method was to offer witnesses
substantiating the juror's partiality or lack of another relevant
qualification'. Corroboration was not required-only one witness was
necessary 2 5 A second way to make out a challenge was to question the
juror in voir dire. By the late eighteenth century, however, there were
limitations on such questioning. Jurors could not be asked any question
that might cause the juror to "discover that of himself which tends to his
Shame, Infamy and Disgrace." 26 Courts did not permit defendants to
inquire whether the potential juror had declared an opinion as to the
correct outcome of the case prior to trial. 27 The rationale for this rule
was articulated by Lord Chief Justice Treby in the Trial of Peter Cooke:
"I think it is a very shameful discovery of a man's weakness and rashness,

12 Albion 235. For an example of the defendant's difficulties in challenging jurors without
knowledge of the potential jurors, see the Trial of Stephen Colledge, [1681] 8 Howell's State Trials
549 at 587-88.
22 See Langbein, supra note 21.
23 Bacon (1786), supra note 8 at 265-66; and Trial of Titus Oates, [1685] 10 Howell's State
Trials 1079 at 1081.
24 See Bacon (1786), supra note 8 at 266-67; Chitty, supra note 9 at 549; Bacon (1832), supra
note 8 at 573-74.
25 Bacon (1786), supra note 8 at 267.
26

Ibid.

27

Ibid
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if not malice, to judge before he hears the cause, and before the party
that is accused could be tried." 28
Due to this limitation, the most common eighteenth-century
method of demonstrating a juror's partiality was through the production
of witnesses. A successful challenge in the 1753 Trial of John Barbot29
illustrated this tendency. Charged with murder, Barbot successfully
challenged a juror on the ground that the juror had expressed an opinion
hostile to the accused:
Prisoner

May it please your honours, I challenge Mr. Armour for cause: My
cause of challenge is this:-Mr. Armour lately at Montserrat was
heard to say, that, if he was upon my jury, he would hang me.

Mr.President

Can you prove this declaration of Mr. Armour's?

Prisoner

Yes, I pray that Mr. Frye may be sworn to prove it.

Mr.President

Swear Mr. Frye. (Which was done.)

Mr. Frye

I heard Mr. Armour say at Montserrat, that, if he was to be on Mr.
Barbot's jury, he would condemn him.

Solicitor General

This is abundant cause, to be sure. 30

Three elements of this exchange are noteworthy for the purposes of this
article: the requirement that extrinsic evidence be brought forward to
demonstrate the challenge; the failure to use the potential juror as a
source of obtaining information for a challenge; and the court's
willingness to accept the challenge simply because of the juror's previous
expression as to the proper outcome of the case.
III. NINETEENTH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
A. English Jurisprudence
1. Jury challenges in England
The fundamental elements of the English doctrine of jury
challenges received substantial judicial attention in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Two explanations for this trend seem plausible.
28 Trial of PeterCook, [1696] 13 Howell's State Trials 311 at 335.
29 [1753] 18 Howell's State Trials 1229.
30

Ibid. at 1233.
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First, the increased lawyerization of the English courtroom in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw lawyers attempt to take
advantage of any procedural rules that might assist their clients. For
example, the emergence of criminal trial lawyers helped to establish and
clarify the laws of evidence. 3 1 Second, there was an increase in
prosecutions in which political and social conflict put defendants in peril,
thus leading to claims that jurors were biased because of their political
or social views. During the eighteenth century, the jurors in the
"common" jury were typically of a higher social standing than the
accused.32 Standing before potential trial juries composed of citizens
with social views fundamentally opposed to the accused's actions,
defendants assisted by counsel may have increasingly attempted to
exercise their right of challenge. It appears, however, that English
defendants and their lawyers lost the legal battle over challenges. In a
series of cases, courts limited the accused's use of challenges for cause.
The Crown, meanwhile, strengthened its ability to select a jury of its
choice through the use of stand-asides. The latter development will be
discussed first.
2. Stand-asides by the Crown
The Crown's right to stand-aside jurors became a more powerful
tool as the size of state trial jury pools increased during the eighteenth
and nineteenth century. With larger numbers of jurors summoned, the
Crown could stand-aside a greater number of potential jurors before
having to demonstrate cause.33 In several cases, defendants argued that
the large jury pools were unfair, but in the late eighteenth century courts
settled the debate in favour of the Crown. In 1722, a defendant raised
the issue of jury pools, 34 and the question gained increased prominence

31 See J.H. Langbein, "Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the
Ryder Sources" (1996) 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1168 at 1172; Beattie, supra note 18 at 232; and S.
Landsman, "The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century
England" (1990) 75 Cornell L. Rev. 497 at 569-72.
32 See Hay, supra note 11 at 311.

33 State trials were cases relating to affairs of the state; many state trials involved treason
offences. Sheriffs had discretion to determine the number of jurors to be returned, and often
selected jurors very carefully to ensure convictions. For discussions of state trials, see J.H. Langbein,

"The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers" (1978) 45 U. Chi. L Rev. 263 at 264-67; and J.C. Oldham,
"Origins of the Special Jury," U. Chi. L. Rev. 137 at 153-59.
34

See Trialof ChristopherLayer, [1722] 16 Howell's State Trials 93 at 134-35.
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in the 1794 treason trial of John Home Tooke.S Tooke argued against
Crown stand-asides on two grounds. First, he argued that the act of 1305
had eliminated the Crown's right to challenge peremptorily, and thus the
Crown could not stand-aside jurors. Tooke pleaded with the judges: "My
Lords, stop, turn back, you must be in the wrong road." 36 This argument
was easily disposed of: "As far as our legal history affords us any
information upon the subject," began the Lord Chief Justice,
the course is a clear one; the crown has no peremptory challenge, but the course is, that
the crown may challenge as the names are called over, and is not bound to show the cause
of the challenge until the panel is gone through; that is the course of proceeding, which is
37
now so established that we must take it as the law of the land.

Tooke's second argument was that the greater number of summoned
jurors had altered the balance of the courtroom in favour of the Crown.
This argument failed because the Crown had stood-aside just seven
jurors, although the Lord Chief Justice felt:
that the circumstance, which is become absolutely necessary, of making the panels vastly
more numerous than they were in ancient times, might give to the crown an improper
advantage, arising out of that rule; iand whenever we shall see that improper advantage
attempted to be taken, it will be for the serious consideration of the Court, whether they
will not put it into some course to prevent that advantage being taken. 38

The opportunity for English courts to fashion such a safeguard
against the improper use of stand-asides slipped away in the 1798 case R.
v. O'Coigly39 in which eight men were tried for high treason. After the
Crown stood aside eleven jurors, defence counsel argued that the
Crown's use of stand-asides should not be permitted, claiming, as in
Tooke, that the increased size of jury pools had unfairly increased the
Crown's stand-aside power. Justice Buller swept this argument aside,
concluding that the law "is as firmly and as fully settled on this point, as
any one question that can arise on the law of England," 40 while Justice
Lawrence reasoned that a uniform number of people in the jury pool
could not be judicially regulated. The O'Coigly decision dictated the
Crown's ability to stand-aside jurors would remain a powerful tool for
the Crown throughout the nineteenth century. Despite occasional
35 Trialof John Home Tooke, [1794] 25 Howell's State Trials 1 [hereinafter Tooke].
36

Ibid. at 24.

37

Ibid at 25.
381Ibid.
39 [1798] 26 Howell's State Trials 1191 [hereineafter O'Coigly].
40
IbM. at 1240.
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complaints following O'Coigly, the courts refused to reconsider the law.
For example, a defendant unsuccessfully raised the issue of jury pool size
in 1817,41 and in 1839 Frederick Pollock unsuccessfully argued against
the Crown's right to stand-aside jurors in R. v. John Frost,42 despite a
panel consisting of over three hundred potential jurors. 43 In the 1857
case Mansell v. R., the English judiciary was again unwilling to consider
the problematic expansion of jury pools.44 These decisions effectively
awarded an unlimited number of peremptory challenges to the Crown. 45
In comparison, the defendant in the first half of the nineteenth century
had a right to twenty peremptory challenges in felony and thirty-five in
treason, after which he or she could only challenge for cause. The only
positive development for the accused may have been a trend that
emerged in the mid-nineteenth century to permit defendants some
peremptory challenges in misdemeanour, though the extent of this trend
is unknown. 46
Prosecutors in the nineteenth century often made substantial use
of stand-asides in state trials. McEldowney has difficulty determining the
extent to which stand-asides were employed in England and Ireland, but
he concludes that stand-asides were probably common in political state
trials, 47 particularly in Ireland, where prosecutors purged Catholic jurors

41 See Trialof JeremiahBrandreth, [1817] 32 Howell's State Trials 755 at 772.
42

R. v.John Frost, [1839] 173 E.R. 771 [hereinafter Frost].

43 "In Defence of the Jury," supra note 5 at 163-64. Pollock argued that the consolidation of
jury laws in 1825 required the Crown to show cause: see An Act for consolidatingand amending the
Laws relative to Jurorsand Juries, 1825 (U.K.), 6 Geo. IV, c. 50, s. 29. The court in Frost,supra note

42, reasoned that this was merely a reenactment of the 1305 statute that had been the basis of standasides: ibid at 776. But see Sawdon's Case, [1838] 168 E.R. 1099, in which the court required the
Crown to show cause because of the 1825 statute.
44

Mansell v. R., [1857] 120 E.R. 20. See also "Some Aspects of Law," supra note 4 at 141.

45 See Thompson, supra note 5 at 159.
46 See D. Bentley, English CriminalJustice in the Nineteenth Century (London: Hambledon
Press, 1998) at 95. In Creed v. Fisher,[1854] 156 E.R. 202, a civil case in which the defendant had

not been permitted a peremptory challenge, Baron Parke commented that in "practice it has been
usual, as a matter of courtesy, to allow peremptory challenges in civil cases and misdemeanours, but
it is not a matter of right": ibid. at 202. See also R. v. Blakeman, [1850] 175 E.R. 479 at 479.
47 "Some Aspects of Law," supra note 4 at 145. For a description of challenges in Ireland

during the nineteenth century, see W.G. Huband, A PracticalTreatise on the Law Relating to the
Grand Jury in CriminalCases the Coroner'sJury and the Petty Jury in Ireland (London: Stevens and

Sons, 1896) at 611-96.
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from juries. 48 In state trials it was not unusual for jury pools of over two
hundred jurors to be formed. In such circumstances it was possible for
the Crown to pick a jury very carefully. There is no evidence that jury
pools increased in size for ordinary felony cases prior to 1820, suggesting
that the law of stand-asides was formed in the particular societal context
surrounding many state trials.
3. Defence challenges for cause
In comparison to the Crown's ability to shape a jury's
composition to its liking, defendants' capacity to remove jurors for cause
was limited during the early nineteenth century. The 1821 case of R. v.
Edmonds49 was of particular importance. The court held that jurors
could form and express opinions about the proper outcome of the trial,
as long as that belief was not based on "ill will" towards the defendant.
Chief Justice Abbott reasoned that
expressions used by a juryman are not a cause of challenge, unless they are to be referred
to something of personal ill-will towards the party challenging; and also, that the juryman
himself is not to be sworn, where the cause of challenge tends to his dishonour; and, to be
sure, it is a very dishonourable thing for a man to express ill-will towards a person
accused of a crime, in regard to the matter of his accusation. 50

The requirement that ill will be demonstrated broke with eighteenthcentury law, which required only that the juror form and express an
opinion to be disqualified. How, then, was the defendant to show that
the potential juror had formed and expressed a view of the trial's
outcome based on ill will towards the accused? Chief Justice Abbott
continued the eighteenth-century practice and held that an accused must
provide extrinsic evidence for a challenge of partiality. Thus, the court
required the defendant to locate prima facie evidence demonstrating that
the juror had formed and expressed an opinion of the accused's guilt out
of ill-will prior to the trial.51 In Chitty's The Practice of the Law in All its
Departments, practitioners were thus encouraged to research the

48 "Some Aspects of Law," supra note 4 at 144; D. Johnson, "Trial by Jury in Ireland 18601914" (1996) 17 J. of Legal Hist. 270 at 282-86; and F.W. Maitland, Justice and Police (New York:
Russell & Russell, 1885) at 166-67.
49 [1814-23] All E.R. 241 [hereinafter Edmonds].
50

Ibid at 250.

51 See also R. v. Dowling (1848), 3 Cox C.C. 509 at 510 [hereinafter Dowling]; and Sir P.
Devlin, Trial byJury (London: Methuen, 1966) at 32.
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partiality of jurors outside of the courtroom. 52 The cost of such research
prevented most defendants from following this advice, and, not
surprisingly, the provision of extrinsic evidence of partiality born out of
ill will was a burden that few defendants were able to meet.
What motivated the court in Edmonds to determine that
potential jurors could only be excluded if their comments had been
motivated by ill will? E.P. Thompson suggests that the Edmonds decision
was politically motivated. 53 The defendants in Edmonds.were some of
the most important leaders in English Radicalism, and the defence,
according to Thompson, knew there "was no way in which Warwickshire
jurors in 1820 could express hostility towards Radicalism without also
expressing a particular hostility against these notorious leaders of the
cause of Reform." 54 Only by limiting the ability of the defence to
eliminate jurors could the court ensure that socially conservative juries
would be selected. Chief Justice Abbott thus permitted jurors even if
they had uttered a belief in the accused's guilt. Despite having been
decided in a period of acute political and class strife, in which the state
attempted to repress most democratic claims, Edmonds continues to be
cited in English criminal cases. 55
Courts also disallowed attempts by defendants to draw other
evidence out of jurors during voir dire examinations. For example, in
Dowling the defendant wished to ask whether the potential juror was one
of the constables who had helped to end a Chartist plot for which the
57
accused was charged. 5 6 The court refused to permit this question.
Similarly, in 1845 the courts prevented an accused charged with
fraudulently obtaining food from asking jurors whether they were
members of an association for prosecuting people who committed frauds
on tradespeople. The court refused this questioning, stating that it "is

52 See J. Chitty, The Practice of the Law in All its Departments (London: Stevens and Son,

1836) at 795. See also J. Chitty, The Practiceof the Law in All its Departments (London: Stevens and
Son, 1842) at 670.
53 "In Defence of the Jury," supra note 5.
54

Ibid. at 160.

55

Ibid. at 161-62.
Supra note 51.

56
57

Ibid.
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quite a new course to catechise [ask a series of questions to] a jury in this
way."ss The restrictions on voir dire were thus strengthened.
4. England: conclusions
The nineteenth-century English jurisprudence concerning jury
challenges limited the accused's ability to obtain an impartial jury.
Defendants retained peremptory challenges, but the courts strengthened
the Crown's ability to sift through jurors by approving of stand-asides
even when jury pools increased in size. The courts made it difficult for
defendants to challenge by continuing to enforce the rule that extrinsic
evidence, and not juror questioning in voir dire, was normally the only
viable method to demonstrate partiality. More importantly, judges
required defendants to demonstrate that expressions of opinion as to
guilt be based upon ill-will. As a result of these developments challenges
remained uncommon in English courtrooms. Many nineteenth-century
English legal writers commented on the rarity of challenges in normal
practice, 59 and in his 1966 study of the English jury system, Sir Patrick
Devlin declared that challenges for cause in England were obsolete, as
the last reported case dealing with challenges for cause was ninety years
old.60
Two reasons can be posited to explain this trend. The first relates
to class unrest in England. The Crown, through its ability to stand-aside
jurors, could prohibit social critics from sitting on juries, while
defendants found it increasingly difficult to demonstrate a sufficient
challenge for cause against jurors biased in favour of the Crown. 61 A
second explanation relates to the nineteenth-century attempt to make
the law more "scientific," a trend which encouraged the legal profession

58

v. Stewart (1845), 1 Cox C.C. 174 at 175. But see Swain and others' Case, [1838] 168 E.R.

1098 where the Crown was permitted to inquire whether jurors had taken part in the riot over a
poor law amendment for which the accused were to be tried. Justice Coleridge determined that "a

person, who had taken an active part on either side, with respect to a measure that had caused so
much excitement as was known to have occurred at Bradford [the location of the riot], could not be
regarded as a indifferent juror; he should, therefore, allow the challenge, provided the prosecutor
could prove the fact": Ibid at 1098.
59

See, for example, J.F. Archbold, The Practiceof the County Attomies and TheirAgents, in the
Courts of Law at Westminster (London: Shaw and Sons, 1838) at 432; Sir J.F. Stephen, A History of
the CriminalLawof England,vol. 1 (London: Burt Franklin, 1883) at 303; and C.S. Kenny, Outlines
of CriminalLaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902) at 475.
60

Devlin, supra note 51 at 29.

61 See "In Defence of the Jury," supra note 5 at 156-57.
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to hide juror bias. Juries were criticized by proponents of legal
formalism, an intellectual movement that gained strength as the
nineteenth century progressed,6 2 and the decisions limiting the right of
chafilenge can be seen as part of the greater movement in England to
make the law more scientific and certain. By reducing the apparent
partiality in the administration of the law, there would be a concurrent
increase in the perceived fairness of the law. Jury bias was a hindrance to
this goal, but the solution was intriguing; by limiting the right of
challenge, courts hid the bias of jurors, particularly in urban centres
wh ere little was known of the panel members. The courts thus created
the appearance of impartiality, and the law looked more scientific and
reasonable even if juries were, in fact, still unpredictable.
B. American Jurisprudence
1. Jury challenges in the United States
The rise of legal formalism was also an important factor in
American developments concerning jury challenges during the
nineteenth century. However, owing to the unique societal conditions in
America, this intellectual trend had the opposite effect: the youthful
United States' concern with controlling tyrannical state power led to the
opening up of jury challenges.
Historical research into nineteenth-century American juries has
been very limited. 63 This is at least partly a result of the structure of
American federalism, in which federal and state courts developed
different rules concerning jury selection. 64 While the potential for
historical research in American jury challenge developments is vast, this
article attempts only to outline the general trends in practice and
doctrine during the nineteenth century. The developments in New York
and Massachusetts in particular will be discussed, as these jurisdictions
offer insight into the reasons behind changing Canadian legal practices.
62 The effect of legal formalism on juries has been discussed in the context of nineteenthcentury civil trials: see P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1979) at 390-91, 394.
63 Alschuler and Deiss describe the lack of research on the American jury as an example of
"aftnishing scholarly neglect": A.W. Alschuler & A.G. Deiss, "A Brief History of the Criminal Jury
in the United States" (1994) 61 U. Chi. L Rev. 867 at 868.
64 See H.M. Hyman & C.M. Tarrant, "Aspects of American Jury Trial History" in R.J. Simon,
ed., The Jury stem inAmerica:A CriticalOverview (London: Sage, 1975) at 23.
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The jury system in the American colonies was similar to that of
England prior to the War of Independence. American jury trials before
the nineteenth century, like their English counterparts, tended to be
relatively quick affairs. The jury was nevertheless celebrated in the early
republic, as that period was marked by a significant concern with due
process rights. 65 Americans regarded the jury as a limitation on
despotism, a feeling that was accentuated in the United States by the
struggle against England, 66 the Crown's use of packed juries in the preRevolutionary period, 67 and the nationalism of the early republic. 68 The
jury was a powerful ideological institution, and many American legal
professionals during the early nineteenth century believed that juries
possessed the power to determine questions of law as well as fact. 69 The
dominant legal discourse substantiated this view. Natural rights theory
stood for the proposition that natural justice was a better source of
authority than black-letter maxims. 70 Since "natural law was thought to
be accessible to the ordinary man, the theory invited each juror to
inquire for himself whether a particular rule of law was consonant with
principles of higher law."71 The importance attributed to juries helps
explain the early nineteenth-century American effort to limit juror bias.
Parties were given increased rein to ask jurors about their views, a trend
that was strengthened by the increased lawyerization of the American
courtroom and the American Sixth Amendment, which guarantees an
impartial jury. 72
Four major differences emerged between the English and
American law of challenges in the nineteenth century. First, the English
practice of stand-asides (recall that the Crown was not provided with any
65 See D.J. Bodenhamer, FairTrial: Rights of the Accused in American History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992) at 48-66.
66
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 63 at 869-75.
67 See S.M. Gutman, "The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right"
(1972) 39 Brook. L. Rev. 290 at 294-95.
68 "The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century" (1964) 74 Yale L.J. 170 at 171
[hereinafter "Changing Role"].
69 See K.L. Hall, The Magic Mirror Law in American History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989) at 173.
70
"Changing Role," supra note 68 at 172.
71

IbkL For an analysis of the intellectual movements that provided a foundation for powerful
juries in the United States, see S.C. Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law: Anglo-American
JurisprudenceBefore John Marshall(London: Macmillan Press, 1990) at 87-89,107-09, 131-32.
72 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; J.M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain
Commitment to RepresentativePanels (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1977) at 142.
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peremptory challenges) was gradually replaced in the United States by
peremptory challenges for the prosecution. Following the Revolution
the issue of stand-asides was controversial, but American jurisdictions
nevertheless accepted the practice during the early decades of the
nineteenth century. 73 In 1827, Justice Story of the United States
Supreme Court approved the practice of standing-asides, 74 but as the
nineteenth century progressed most American states passed statutes
permitting the prosecution to use peremptory challenges. 75 This trend
gradually resulted in the requirement that the government employ
peremptory challenges rather than stand-asides. 76 By 1836,
Massachusetts permitted the prosecution the same number of
peremptory challenges as parties in civil actions, 7 7 and in 1869 the
government's common law right to stand-aside potential jurors was
ended in favour of prosecution peremptories. By 1836, New York also
permitted the government the same number of peremptories as parties
in civil actions, 78 and in 1873 the New York legislature ended the
prosecution's use of stand-asides in all felonies and misdemeanours. The
legislation provided the prosecution with the same number of
peremptories as it permitted the defence. 79
The second difference to emerge between American and English
practice in the nineteenth century related to the number of peremptories
permitted to defendants. Several American states altered the number of
peremptories allowed to the defendant. The laws of New York offer one
example. An 1801 New York statute followed the common law
entitlement, providing thirty five challenges to those charged with
treason8 0 and twenty challenges to those facing capital punishment or

73 See S.D. Thompson, A Treatise on the Law of Trials in Actions Civil and Criminal,vol. 1
(Chicago: T.H. Flood & Co., 1889) at 44-46 [hereinafter Law of Trials]; and Van Dyke, supra note
72 at 148.
74 See United States v. Marchant,25 U.S. 700 at 700-01 (1827); and Beck, supra note 3 at 966, n.
39.
75 See Van Dyke, supra note 72 at 150.
76 See Beck, supra note 3. Thompson noted that in some states stand-asides continued to be
used even after the prosecution was granted peremptory challenges, but noted that "its retention
cannot be defended upon principle": Law of Trials, supra note 73 at 46. See also Van Dyke, supra
note 72at 150.
77

See R.S.M. 1836, c. 137, s. 4.
78 R.S.N.Y. 1836, c. 2, Tit. 5, §11.
79 Laws of N.Y. 1873, c. 427, §2.
80 Laws of N.Y. 1802, c. 29, s. 5.
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life imprisonment.S1 By 1881, defendants in a capital case were allowed
thirty peremptories, while defendants facing ten or more years in prison
could employ twenty. Such statutory alterations to the common law were
common in many States. A summary of American jurisdictions in 1880
found that the majority of states permitted twenty peremptories for the
accused in felony cases, but that in some states the exact number varied
between six and thirty five.8 2 Michigan, for example, permitted thirty
peremptories to the accused in a capital case.83 An 1836 Massachusetts
statute permitted twenty peremptories.8 4 Kentucky was more ingenious
in its legislative alteration to the common law. Kentucky law dictated
that both the state and the accused could peremptorily challenge onefourth of the jury pool summoned. 5
A third difference between American and English practice was
the extension of challenges to the accused in misdemeanour. As early as
1834, Pennsylvania, for example, permitted four peremptories for those
charged with a misdemeanour.8 6 New York was relatively slow to
develop such a rule; it was not until 1881 that New York permitted five
peremptories to defendants accused of a misdemeanour. While states
instituted misdemeanour peremptories at various times during the
nineteenth century, by 1889 most states permitted such challenges.8 7
The fourth difference to emerge between American and English
practice was the expansion in the United States of the grounds and
procedures by which a juror could be challenged for partiality. As we
have seen, the eighteenth-century common law rule was that potential
jurors could be challenged on the ground that they had formed and
expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Unlike
in England, American courts did not limit this ground with a
requirement that such statements be made out of ill will towards the
defendant. Rather, American law retained and expanded the rule to
require only that the juror admit.the existence of an opinion to support a
good cause of challenge.8 8
81 Laws of N.Y. 1802, c. 60, s. 9.
82 See J. Proffat, A Treatise on Trial by Jury (San Francisco: Sumner Whitney & Co., 1880) at
209.
83 Mich. Comp. Laws, § 7951 (1871).
84 R.S.M., supranote 77, s.5.
85

Gen- Stat. (1873) p. 572.

86

Actof14thApff, 1834, s. 140, Purdon's Digest. 6th ed. 620.

87

SeeLaw of Trials, supra note 73 at 37, n. 3.

88

bid. at 67-68.
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The break from English tradition was the treason trial of Aaron
Burr in 1807.89 Burr, who was Vice President under Thomas Jefferson
from 1801 to 1805, killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel, and then raised
a small army in Kentucky. Burr was tried for treason, but the highlypublicized nature of the case made it difficult to find jurors without
knowledge or an opinion of the events in question. Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, who sat as trial judge for
the case, ruled that preconceived notions of the dispute constituted a
valid challenge for cause, and that jurors should be questioned to
determine their views.9 0 Preconceived notions, Marshall C.J. reasoned,
were similar to a relationship with one of the parties. "It would be
strange," he stated, "if the law would be so solicitous to secure a fair trial
as to exclude a distant, unknown relative from the jury, and yet to be
totally regardless of those in whose minds feelings existed much more
unfavourable to an impartial decision of the case." 9 1 Chief Justice
Marshall voiced his concern that jurors "will listen with more favor to
that testimony which confirms, than to that which would change his
opinion; it is not to be expected that he will weigh evidence or argument
as fairly as a man whose judgment is not made up in the case." 92 While
this test broke with English tradition, Marshall C.J. still recognized that
a completely impartial jury was impossible to achieve:
The opinion which has been avowed by the court is, that light impressions which may
fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the
mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a
juror; but that those strong and deep impressions which will close the mind against the
testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony,
and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him. 9 3

This rule was applied in Burr, however, such that any juror who had
formed and expressed an opinion as to Burr's guilt or innocence was
excluded from the jury regardless of whether or not it was a "light
impression." The voir dire examination of John Horace Upshaw provides
an example of how far the court was willing to go to exclude those with
any opinions of the case. Upshaw initially stated that he
conceived himself to stand there as an unprejudiced juryman, for he was ready to attend

to the evidence; but that as he had formed opinions hostile to the prisoner, (if opinions
89 United States v. Burr,25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D.Va.) (1807) (No. 14, 692) [hereinafter Burr].

90 Van Dyke, supranote 72 at 142.
91 Burr,supra note 89 at 50.
92 Ibid.
93

Ibid. at 50-51.
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they can be called which are formed from newspaper testimony,) and had, he believed,

frequently expressed them, [but] that he was unwilling to subject himself to the
imputation of having prejudged the cause. 94

Burr challenged Upshaw for cause. The prosecutor howled protest,
declaring that Upshaw was an intelligent and upright man, and that the
court "might as well enter at once a nolle prosequi, if he is to be
rejected." 95 Counsel then debated Upshaw's impartiality, followed by an
interrogation of Upshaw in voir dire, when Upshaw admitted that he had
argued in conversations that Burr was guilty and had expressed his belief
that Burr was dangerous to the community. He was thus found
unqualified to sit on the jury.
The Burr decision was a landmark in the American law of
challenges, leading almost all American state courts to permit
questioning of jurors to determine bias.96 By the end of the nineteenth
century, the most common ground of challenge in criminal cases
stemmed from jurors' opinions concerning the particular merits of the
case. 97 Opinions formed and expressed from newspaper accounts of a
case were often found to be a sufficient cause of challenge, questioning
during the voir dire poked and prodded at the prejudices of the jurors,
and courts strictly adhered to the common law rule that prevented the
Swearing of jurors who had formed and expressed an opinion regarding
the accused's guilt or innocence.
Throughout the nineteenth century, judges wrestled with the
vague test for challenges for cause as articulated in Burr. In Francis
Wharton's 1852 criminal law treatise, which summarized the various
tests employed in American states, the author noted that "some conflict
exists as to the degree of bias necessary to exclude a juror."98 Wharton
suggested that in New York, Iowa, and perhaps Massachusetts the
formation of an opinion founded entirely on the assumption of a
particular state of facts based on rumour was sufficient to be excluded
from a jury. However, in Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Indiana, and Illinois the
formation of a hypothetical opinion, based upon assumed facts for which
the juror had not evaluated the truth was an insufficient ground for
94

IbicL at 78.

95 Ibid.

96 See Van Dyke, supranote 72 at 143.
97

Law of Trials,supranote 73 at 66.

98 F. Wharton, A Treatise of the CriminalLaw of the United States, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia:
James Kay, Jun. and Brother, 1852) at 854-55.
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exclusion, provided that the hypothetical opinion was rebuttable in the
juror's mind. 99 New York's low threshold to successfully challenge a
juror for cause was evident as early as 1830. In People v. Mather the court
held that a successful challenge could be made out if the juror had
formed, though not expressed, an opinion as to the guilt of the accused.
However, New York brought its test into line with the majority of states
in 1872 when it enacted legislation providing that the previous formation
or expression of an opinion would not preclude a potential juror's
membership on the panel, as so long as the juror "verily believes that he
can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence submitted to
the jury on such trial," and that both the prospective juror and the court
were satisfied that the previous opinion would not shape the final
verdict. 100
Despite such legislative efforts, however, the case law pertaining
to challenges was still said to be in a state of confusion in 1889.101 The
jurisprudence suggested that a juror was acceptable as long as they did
not have views that could be described as fixed, settled, absolute,
positive, decided, deliberate, or unconditional. 102 On the other hand, a
potential juror seeming to side with the accused-for example, hoping
that the accused would be found innocent-was generally a successful
ground for challenge by the prosecutor. 103 Although jurors were not to
be disqualified for simply possessing knowledge of the case, there were
many instances in which information gained through the press
disqualified a juror. 104 Several famous cases in which the voir dire
became an extremely lengthy procedure demonstrate that knowledge of
the events in question often led to successful challenges. For instance, in
the 1886 New York trial of Jacob Sharp, the court summoned 2,100
panelists, examined 1,196, and spent twenty-two days in jury selection.1 05
While challenges became more common in American
courtrooms, the distinction between principle challenges and challenges
for favour in the context of claims of partiality broke down.106 Attempts

99

Ibid

100 Laws of N.Y. 1872, c. 475.
101 Law of Trials, supra note 73 at 66.
102 Ibid. at 69.
103 Ibid. at 63-64.
104 Ibid. at 72-77.
105 See "In Defence of the Jury," supranote 5 at 162.
106 See C. La Rue Munson, "Selecting the Jury" (1894-1895) 4 Yale LJ. 173 at 178.
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to differentiate between the two breeds of challenges troubled
nineteenth-century American jurists. For instance, in State v. Benton the
court reasoned that an opinion fully formed and expressed was a good
cause of principle challenge. On the other hand, "an opinion imperfectly
formed, or an opinion merely hypothetical, that is to say, founded on the
supposition that facts are as though they have been represented or
assumed to be" could constitute a challenge to the favour "which is to be
allowed or disallowed as the triers may find the fact of favour or
indifferency."1 07 Distinguishing between a "perfectly" and "imperfectly"
formed opinion was problematic. John Proffat discussed a possible
solution in 1880. Asserting that the distinction between challenges for
favour and principle challenges "was not founded on any philosophical
distinction," 108 Proffat suggested that the
two divisions of a challenge for cause have existed for a long time, and have on many
occasions been confounded; for the dividing line between them is very indistinct, and
sometimes purely arbitrary; so that one would be puzzled often to distinguish one from
the other. So unsatisfactory is the separation and boundary line between them, that of
late the distinction is in many places abandoned, and in others practically disregarded.1 09

The failure of American courts to fashion suitable, scientific tests
for the common law framework led to the declining use of triers in the
United States during the nineteenth century. The use of triers was likely
also undermined by the increasingly technical design of the law
propounded by the American judiciary, which often led judges to take
control of the law's application at the expense of juries.110 The decision
in People v. Bodinell exemplified the potential for arbitrariness of triers
given the discretionary nature of their roles. The court commented on
the difficulty of laying down clear rules for the method of evaluation to
be employed by triers; rather, triers' decisions "must be determined
upon their conscience and discretion." 112 To the legal formalists of the
nineteenth century such discretion was highly problematic.
An examination of legal treatises and cases of this period
demonstrates a gradual decrease in the use of triers. An 1834
Massachusetts treatise concerning the role of triers in the state's courts
107 State v. Benton, 2 Dev. & B. 196 at 212, 213.
1 08

Proffat, supra note 82 at 221.

109 Ibid. at 220.
110 See M.J. Horwitz, The Transfonnationof American Law, 1760-1860 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1977) at 28-29, 84-85,141-43; Hall, supra note 69 at 173.
111 (1845) N.Y.S.C.R. 281.
112
Ibid.
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argue that the judge was most suited to determining the partiality of
jurors, and concluded that "it is understood, that in all cases, the court
act as triers." 113 The use of triers could be waived in favour of judicial
determinations in New York by 1830, provided that there was agreement
among the parties involved.11 4 By 1867 this consent was assumed in the
absence of an objectionI 1 5 and six years later the state officially ended
the use of triers.1 1 6 Federal legislation eliminated the use of triers for
determining challenges to the poll in 1872.117 Most states were said to
have ceased employing triers by 1880,118 and in 1895 it was asserted to be
"ordinary American practice" that judges determined all challenges to
the poll. 1 19
As grounds for challenge broadened in the United States, rules
for what questions were allowed of potential jurors in voir dire deviated
substantially from English practice. In 1889, Seymour Thompson wrote
that, as a general rule, "a party has no right to examine the venire-man
by way of fishing for some ground of challenge."1 2 0 This was the English
practice, but Thompson also noted that this rule should be accepted with
caution.12 1 While questions were supposed to be pertinent, and, as in
England, were not to degrade the juror, several examples illustrate the
breadth of questions American jurors could face. For instance,
questioning could try to elicit facts that would enable a party to
effectively use his or her peremptory challenges. 122 Some courts
permitted questions pertaining to bias, and the result was often a wide
range of inquiry. 23 Questions could even be directed at religious,
political, or racial opinions. For example, in a trial of persons involved in
113 P.O. Thacher, Observationson Some of the Methods Known in the Law of Massachusetts, to
Secure the Selection and Appointment of an ImpartialJury, In Cases Civil and Criminal (Boston:
Russell, Odiorne & Co., 1834) at 21, n. *
114 See People v. Mather, 4 N.Y.S.C.R. 229 (1830).
115 See O'Brienv. People, 36 N.Y. 276 (1867).
116 Laws of N.Y. 1873, c. 427.
117 U.S. Rev. Stat. § 819 (1873-1874). See also Proffat, supra note 82 at 209.
118 See Proffat, supra note 82 at 221-22.
119 J.P. Bishop, New CriminalProcedure or New Commentaries on the Law of Pleadingand
Evidence and the Practicein CriminalCases,vol. 1, 4th ed. (Chicago: T.H. Flood & Co., 1895) at 552.
See also Munson, supra note 106 at 187.
12 0

Law of Trials,supra note 73at 99.

121 Ibid.
122 Ibid. at 99-100. See also Devlin, supra note 51 at 32.
123 See Law of Trials, supra note 73 at 103.
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a riot between immigrant Roman Catholics and native-born Americans,
it was held acceptable to ask jurors whether they had any bias against
Roman Catholics.1 24 A Texas court provides a further illustration. It
permitted jurors to be asked whether they would return the same verdict
against a white man for killing a black man as they would if a white man
killed another white.1 25

2. United States: Conclusions
This brief outline of American challenges in the nineteenth
century shows that the prosecutor's right to stand-aside was statutorily
replaced by peremptory challenges, while courts and legislatures
loosened the restrictions that, in England, prevented challenges for
cause. Three factors help to explain these developments. First, the
United States' revolutionary past created a preoccupation with the
attainment of unbiased juries supported in turn by a belief in natural
rights. Second, the questioning and investigation of jurors' partiality
likely expanded as counsel took a greater role in the voir dire during the
nineteenth century.126 As the use of triers declined in favour of judicial
determinations of challenges for favour, courts permitted lawyers to
directly question potential jurors.1 27 While English lawyers were
prevented from aggressively questioning jurors, American judges
permitted lawyers to test whether the juror's views could be challenged
on the basis of the vague test set out in Burr.128
The third factor shaping the development of American jury
selection procedures was the changing ideological perception of the jury
during the late nineteenth century. Instead of focusing on the juror's role
124 See People v. Christie,2 Abb. Pr. 256; 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).

125 See Lester v. State, 2 Tex. App. 432 (1877). While this article does not explore the racial
controversy surrounding jury selection in the United States, the issue undoubtedly played an
important role during the nineteenth century. For example, the flexible test permitting jurors to be
sworn who had previously voiced an opinion regarding the accused's guilt dictated that some courts
allowed racially-biased citizens to become jurors: see A.E.K. Nash, "Fairness and Formalism in the
Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the Old South" in W. Holt, ed., Essays in
Nineteenth-CenturyAmerican Legal History (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976) 500 at 51719. For a more general'discussion of racial issues regarding nineteenth-century American juries, see
Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 64 at 36-40.
126 J.D. Rice, "The Criminal Trial Before and After the Lawyers: Authority, Law, and Culture
in Maryland Jury Trials, 1681-1837" (1996) 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 455 at 464-65.
12 7
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in defending individual liberty, critics claimed that the jury was an
expression of oppressive public opinion. 129 Motivating this view was a
shift in legal analysis more generally. Proponents of formalist legal
analysis argued that the application of precedent and strict adherence to
legal doctrine would prevent charges of legal bias. The aim was to
"import into the processes of legal reasoning the qualities of certainty
and logical inexorability."1 30 This intellectual trend clearly affected
American juries as well. Opponents of juries
focused on the positive law as a system leading to predictable results. The notion that the
positive law could be set aside by any perverse juror was incompatible with their view of
the law as a coherent set of principles by which men could order their lives and predict
the consequences of their actions.

131

This intellectual trend resulted in substantial changes in American jury
practices, most of which attempted to control the jury and make it more
predictable. For example, special and directed verdicts were
instituted. 32 In this context, the judiciary expanded its ability to identify
and remove biased jurors. Given legal formalism's requirement that only
an impartial decisionmaker could make the law certain, this trend is
unsurprising. Unlike the English practice that assumed indifference,
however, the American doctrine attempted to open up jury challenges to
expose and eliminate any biases that would affect the trial.
C. CanadianJurisprudence
1. Jury challenges in Canada
As in the United States, Canada's jury laws closely mirrored
English trends prior to the nineteenth century. Given the different paths
taken by England and the United States, the question arises what effect
these divergent paths had on Canadian law during the nineteenth
century. Several historians have demonstrated that the legal profession
in British North America employed an eclectic form of legal thought
during the nineteenth century that drew from both English and
American legal traditions. Blaine Baker's study of Upper Canadian legal
129 "Changing Role," supra note 68 at 179.
130 See MJ. Horwitz, The Transformationof American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 16.

131 "Changing Role," supra note 68 at 179.
132 Ibid. at 184-86.
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thought has demonstrated the existence of a unique Canadian legal
ideology that relied heavily on both American and English precedents
until the closing decades of the nineteenth century.13 3 As the century
came to a close, however, improvements in communications and the
growth of imperialistic fervour led many Canadian legal professionals to
brand the hybrid Upper Canadian legal thought a bastardized form of
legal analysis. Canadians disparaged American legal traditions, and
there was a shift away from doctrines tainted by American precedents.
The quality and availability of English case reporters improved, and the
doctrine of stare decisis became more important.
The available evidence regarding jury challenges in Ontario,
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island demonstrates
an awareness of the path American jury challenges took after 1800, and,
particularly with regard to peremptory challenges, reflects a willingness
to incorporate American practices.13 4 In other respects, however,
particularly in relation to challenges for cause, Canadian courts
continued to look to English law as the dominant source for substantive
and procedural authority.
Though challenges in Upper Canada during the nineteenth
century are poorly documented, there is evidence of their use. Upper
Canadian legislators copied the colony's early jury laws from England. In
1792, An Act to establish Trials by Jury provided that "Jurors shall be
summoned and taken conformably to the Law and Custom of
England."135 In 1794, William Osgoode framed a more comprehensive
jury act for Upper Canada.1361This
act contemplated that jurors could be
"challenged and set aside." 37 Defendants employed challenges in
treason cases following the War of 1812, including several who
challenged more than twenty prospective jurors, and one who challenged

133 G.B. Baker, "The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-Victorian
Empire" (1985) 3 L. & Hist. Rev. 219. Phillip Girard disagrees with Baker in details, but finds a
similar tendency to apply American doctrines in Nova Scotia earlier in the nineteenth century: P.
Girard, "Themes and Variations in Early Canadian Legal Culture: Beamish Murdoch and his
Epitomesof the Laws ofNova-Scotia" (1993) 11 L. Hist. Rev. 101.
134 This article does not examine jury challenges in Quebec. Quebec jury selection procedure
was complicated by the occasional use of the "mixed jury"--that is, a jury composed of one-half
French and one-half English.
135
AnAct to establish Trialsby Jury, 1792 (U.C.), 32 Geo. III, c. 2.
13 6

AnActfor the regulationofJuries, 1794 (U.C.), 34 Geo. III, c. 1.

13 7

1bid., s. 6.
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as many as thirty-five prospective jurors.138 The 1794 jury act remained
virtually unchanged until 1850,139 at which time the colony promulgated
a comprehensive act to consolidate and amend its jury laws. 140
Following the founding of Halifax in 1749, the basic principles of

English criminal law were imposed in Nova Scotia. 141 Research material
collected by Jim Phillips reveals evidence of challenges in Nova Scotia

between 1749 and 1840,142 although the available evidence generally fails
to record the form of the challenge, and, in some cases, whether it was
the defendant or the prosecution who issued the challenge. A Royal
Navy sailor challenged nine jurors peremptorily in his 1754 murder trial,
while the attorney general challenged an additional two.143 In a 1791

trial in Lunenburg one juror was challenged. 144 Nineteen jurors were
challenged in an 1812 murder trial in Guysborough, 14s and two years
later twelve jurors were peremptorily challenged in Liverpool. 146 In the
murder case of R. v. Rufus Fawcett in 1832, the solicitor general stood-

138 See P. Romney & B. Wright, "State Trials and Security Proceedings in Upper Canada
during the War of 1812" [hereinafter "State Trials"] in F.M. Greenwood & B. Wright, eds.,
Canadian State Trials: Law, Politics, and Security Measures, 1608-1837 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1996) at 391-92. Defendants also employed challenges in Quebec. In the 1797 trial of
David Maclane in Quebec City for high treason the accused challenged 24 jurors and the Crown
challenged 11 of the 86 jurors. Trial of David Maclane, [1797] 26 Howell's State Trials 721 at 747;
and F.M. Greenwood, "The Treason Trial and Execution of David Maclane" (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 3
at 9-10.
139 See P. Romney, Mr. Attorney: The Attorney Generalfor Ontario in Court, Cabinet, and
Legilature, 1791-1899 (Canada: Osgoode Society, 1986) at 18.
140 See An Act for the consolidationand amendment of the Laws relative to Jurors,Juries and
Inquests in that part of this Province called Upper Canada, 1850 (Prov. C.) 13 & 14 Vic., c. 55.
[hereinafterJury Act, 18501.
141 See J.Phillips, "The Criminal Trial in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815" in G.B. Baker & J. Phillips,
eds., Essays in the History of CanadianLaw, Volume VIII: In Honour of R.C.B. Risk (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999) 469; and J. Phillips, "Halifax Juries in the Eighteenth Century"
in G.T. Smith, A.N. May & S. Devereaux, eds., CriminalJustice in the Old World and the New: Essays
in HonourofJ.M. Beattie (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1998) 135 at 138.
142 1 thank Jim Phillips with providing me with the following research material on Nova
Scotia.
143 Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management, Colonial Office Series 217, vol. 15, at
134.
144 See J. Stewart, The Trials of George FrederickBoutelierand John Boutelier (Halifax: John
Howe, 1791) at 5.
145 Report of the Trial of Walter Lee, 1812, Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management,
Record Group 1, vol. 226, No. 16.
146 Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management, Record Group 1, vol. 343.
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aside three potential jurors, while the defendant challenged eleven.) 47
While these examples indicate that challenges were known in Nova
Scotia during this period, the fact that courts did not deal with the
doctrinal issues suggests that emerging American doctrines did not
immediately affect Nova Scotia law. Beamish Murdoch's 1833 treatise on
the law of Nova Scotia substantiates the conclusion that Nova Scotia's
challenging laws remained very similar to those of England-Murdoch's
description of the law of challenges does not deviate from the law in
England.1 48
Newspaper reports of two high-profile cases suggest that the
relatively infrequent use of challenges in Nova Scotia may have resulted
from the perception that challenging was a procedural safeguard of the
guilty. 149 This perception is reflected in the reports of the trial of

Richard Uniake. On trial for murder following an 1819 duel, Uniake had
a high profile in Nova Scotia society, and he was reluctant to challenge
the potential jurors in front of the spectators who packed the courtroom
without explaining his reasons for doing so: "My Lords, as I am now
about to enter upon my trial, wherein my life, my honor, and my
character are at stake; in the name of my friend, and in my own name, I
ask for the indulgence which is shewn to others when placed in a similar
situation."S0 Uniake then challenged several jurors, but felt it necessary
to explain the invocation of his common law right. Uniake
stated to the Court the reason he was induced to do so-His wish was to be tried by an
impartial Jury--by men who were not present in the Court upon the trial of cause, which
had led to this unfortunate event; and he was anxious that persons who had not heard any
thing that passed on one side or the other, should decide upon his conduct, in a
151
transaction in which his life and his honour were depending.

The perception that challenges were a sure sign of guilt can also be
discerned in a newspaper report of the 1840 trial of Smith Clarke and
John Elexon, the former for murder and the latter as an accessory before
the fact. Just as the defendants' appearance and unwillingness to talk to
14 7

Novascotian (3 October 1832).
148 B. Murdoch, Epitome of the Laws of Nova Scotia, vol. IV (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Joseph
Howe, 1833) at 190-92.
149 A second practical consideration was likely the concern that challenging jurors' partiality,
if unsuccessful, might raise the ire of a potential juror. Blackstone commented upon this possibility,
suggesting that "perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a
resentment": W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1st ed., vol. 4, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1769) at 347.
150

Acadian Recorder (31 July 1819).
151 Ibid
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counsel were thought to suggest guilt, their use of challenges
foreshadowed their ultimate conviction:
There was a look of deep dejection on the countenances of both the prisoners, but
particularly that of Clarke. They occasionally held a few moment's conversation with their
legal advisors, but never spoke nor indeed approached, to each other. As the names of

the Jury were called over (the Jurymen being in full view) the prisoners cast eager glances
upon each other as they were severally called. They were evidently extremely anxious that

certain individuals should not be upon the Jury. Clarke only made two challenges, one
separately and the other jointly with Elexon. Elexon made seven separate challenges,

when at last a Jury was satisfactorily collected and sworn. 152

It is therefore plausible that the value of challenging jurors had to be
weighed against the manifest appearance of guilt challenges created.
Peremptory challenges also received the attention of Canadian
legislators. American trends were apparent in three important ways in
the development of Canadian law regarding peremptory challenges.
First, statutory enactments provided defendants charged with a
misdemeanour a small number of peremptory challenges. Though
peremptory challenges were never officially provided to those accused of
a misdemeanour in England, Canadian legislators followed the
American practice during the mid-nineteenth century. Nova Scotia
became the first province to offer peremptories for misdemeanours. In
1838, the government provided three peremptory challenges "in all cases
of the trial of any Issues, Actions or Prosecutions, Civil or Criminal" in
which parties did not already possess a right of peremptory challenge.1 53
In 1848, parties in Halifax County had the number of peremptories
raised to four, though three peremptories remained the norm in other
parts of the colony.154 New Brunswick passed a provision in 1848 similar
to Nova Scotia's 1838 Act, again providing for three peremptory
challenges for defendants in proceedings in which there had not
previously been a right of peremptory challenge155 Upper Canada
followed in 1850, granting defendants charged with a misdemeanour two
peremptory challenges, 156 and increasing the number of defence
peremptories in misdemeanour to three in 1858.157 Prince Edward
152 "Trial of Clarke & Elexon," Acadian Recorder (25 January 1840).
153

An Act for the Regulation of Juries, S.N.S. 1838, c. 6, s. 16. A similar bill had been suggested
in 1825. See also "Jury Bill," Novascotian(9 March 1825).
154AnActforthe regulation of Juries,S.N.S. 1848, c. 34, s. 13.
155 See An Act in additionto the Law relatingto Juries, S.N.B. 1848, c. 15, s. 3.
156 SeeJury Act, 1850, supra note 140, s. 58.
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Island was the last province to create such a right, waiting until 1861 to
provide three peremptories in civil cases and misdemeanours. 158
In contrast to the granting of peremptory challenges to
defendants in misdemeanour, legislators generally reduced the number
of such challenges for other offenders. Again, the timing of these
developments suggests that American trends served as the model. An
1854 New Brunswick statute limited those charged with treason or other
capital offences to twelve peremptory challenges. For other felonies only
six peremptory challenges were permitted. 159 Upper Canada's Jury Act,
1850 dictated that defendants had a right to twenty peremptory
challenges in felony and murder cases, but neglected to mention whether
thirty five peremptories were permitted to the defendant in treason
cases, as in England. 160 Nova Scotia decreased peremptories for felonies,
stipulating in 1864 that in all criminal trials the defendant could
peremptorily challenge only eight jurors.161
A third indication of an American influence on Canadian law
was the granting of peremptory challenges to the prosecution. No such
right ever existed in English practice, though as we have seen a number
of American jurisdictions replaced the prosecution's right to stand-aside
jurors in favour of state peremptories. The timing of the amendments in
Canada suggests an attempt to copy American procedures. Nova Scotia
was first to adopt prosecution peremptories. The 1838 Act that provided
three peremptories to any defendant also applied to prosecutors. It was
the right of defendants, and also of "Plaintiff or Plaintiffs, Prosecutor or
Prosecutors." 162 Nova Scotia increased the number of Crown
peremptories to four in 1859.163 The law of New Brunswick developed
similarly. An act of 1848164 mirrored Nova Scotia's 1838 provision, and
New Brunswick also increased the Crown's right to four peremptories a
year after Nova Scotia's 1859 enactment.1 65 Interestingly, there seems to

158 See An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Grand and Petit Jurors in this
Island, R.S.P.E.I. 1861, c. 10, s. 20.
159 R.S.N.B. 1854, c. 159, s. 10.
160

JuryAct 1850, supra note 140, s. 58.

161 R.S.N.S. 1864, c. 136, s. 51.
16 2 Actforthe regulationof Juries, supra note 153, s. 16.
163 R.S.N.S. 1859, c. 136, s. 49.
164

Act in additionto the Law relatingto Juries,supra note 155, s. 3.

165

AnAct relatingto Procedurein CriminalCases, S.N.B. 1860, c. 32, s. 3.

2000]

Jury Challenges in the 19th Century

485

be no evidence that the Crown received the right of peremptory
challenge in Upper Canada prior to Confederation. 166
An explanation for the lack of Crown peremptories in Upper
Canada might be discerned from the controversy over the Crown's right
to stand-aside jurors created by section 59 of Upper Canada's Jury Act,
1850. Section 59 suggested that the Crown had no right to stand-aside
jurors. The resulting controversy over the meaning of this section led to
a strong judicial assertion of such a right for the Crown. This assertion
may have prevented any move toward American-style prosecutorial
peremptory challenges. The Jury Act, 1850 stated that "in cases in which
the Queen shall be a party, those who sue for the Queen shall not be
allowed a challenge to any Juror who may be called to serve upon the
Jury in any such case, except for cause to be assigned, tried and disposed
of according to the custom of the Court." 167 As has been shown, many
American jurisdictions replaced prosecutorial stand-asides in the 1850s
with peremptory challenges. It would appear in this instance, however,
that the government did not intend to alter the law, despite section 59's
margin note proclaiming "Crown to challenge for cause only."1 68 There
are three clear indications that the colonial government did not intend to
eliminate stand-asides. First, legislators did not give the Crown
peremptory challenges, and it seems unlikely that the legislature would
prevent the Crown from using stand-asides without providing
peremptories to the prosecution. Second, an 1853 amendment repealed
the section in the 1850 statute that appeared to require the Crown to
show cause. This new section was almost identical to an 1825 English act
pertaining to challenges that had been judicially interpreted to permit
stand-asides. 169 In fact, the amending statute of 1853 was more explicit
than its English counterpart in permitting stand-asides, stating that
"nothing herein contained shall affect or be construed to affect the
power of any Court in Upper Canada, to order any Juror to stand by
until the panel shall be gone through, at the prayer of them that
prosecute for the Queen, as has been heretofore accustomed." 170
Criminal cases in which defendants unsuccessfully argued that
the Crown did not have the right to stand-aside jurors are the third
166 See R v. Patteson, (1875) 36 U.C.Q.B. 129 at 136.
167Jury Act, 1850, supra note 140, s. 59.
168 Ibid.
169
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indication that the legislature did not intend to eliminate stand-asides in
the Jury Act, 1850. The Crown's right to stand-aside jurors in Upper
Canada was first substantiated in the 1854 case of R. v. Benjamin. 71
George and Emanuel Benjamin were charged with a misdemeanour for
neglecting their duty as the registrars of Hastings County. At trial, the
defendants claimed that the Crown did not possess the right to standaside jurors because of section 59 of the Jury Act, 1850. The Crown
argued that the 1853 jury act amended the apparent limitation on standsides.1 72 A unanimous court held that the Crown had the right to standaside jurors until the whole panel was gone through, reasoning that since
the 1853 Act was nearly the same as the English act, the same
construction should be applied. Moreover, the court asserted that it had
been well understood that the Crown could stand-aside jurors "in
indictments for misdemeanour as well as for felony, -without shewing
cause, until the panel was exhausted."1 73 The court thus adopted the
English decisions providing for stand-asides, and held that, despite the
1850 statutory change, the Crown had always possessed a right to standside jurors. Chief Justice James Buchanan Macaulay explained that it
has always been my impression that the rights of the Crown since the passing of the 13 &
14 Vic., ch. 55, sec. 59, [the 1850 act] were the same as before; and consequently, that
even before the late act jurors might be requested t6 stand aside until the panel was
exhausted, according to the custom of the court previously. 1 74

The Queen's Bench confirmed this finding in 1859 in R. v. Fellowes. 7S
By the mid-nineteenth century, therefore, the Upper Canadian practice
regarding stand-asides had been shaped in the form of its English
parent, and not in that of many American jurisdictions where standasides had been replaced by peremptory challenges.
By 1868 Upper Canadian doctrine concerning challenges for
caiise was also similar to that of England. Jury challenges were discussed
at length in the appeal of Whelan v. R. to the Court of Queen's Bench,
and subsequently to the Ontario Court of Error and Appeal.17 6 The
defendant was charged with the murder of Thomas D'Arcy McGee, and
at trial had wished to challenge a juror for cause. The trial judge,

171 (1854) 4 U.C.C.P. 179.
1 72
IbiL at 183.
1 73
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175 (1859) 19 U.C.Q.B. 48.
176 (1868) 29 U.C.Q.B. 2 (Q.B.), aff'd (1868), 29 U.C.Q.B. 108 (C.A.) [hereinafter Whelan].
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however, required the defendant to exhaust all of his peremptories
before challenging for cause. The defendant acquiesced, challenging the
juror peremptorily. Upon exhausting his twenty peremptory challenges,
the defendant claimed that he should be permitted an additional
peremptory challenge since he had been forced to use up such a
challenge earlier. The trial court did not permit this. On appeal, the
defendant argued that this error required a new trial. The Queen's
Bench and then the Court of Error and Appeal held that the defendant
clearly possessed the right to challenge for cause prior to exhausting his
peremptory challenges.1 77 The more troubling question, though, was
whether this judicial oversight required a new trial. The Queen's Bench
decided that a new trial was unnecessary, a finding affirmed by the Court
of Appeal.
What is interesting about Whelan, however, is not the reasoning
utilized in this rather unusual case, but the precedents employed.
Decided prior to the apparent shift in legal analysis suggested by
Baker,178 Whelan is particularly valuable because it provides evidence
that Canadians were aware of American doctrines concerning challenges
for cause, and yet were inclined to apply English law. The judges in
Whelan demonstrated a wary stance towards American challenges for
cause doctrine. At the Queen's Bench, for example, after counsel cited
many American cases, Justice Morrison stated that American cases
are not uniform or consistent, either with respect to the practice in such cases or the
principles upon which they are decided; and although such decisions are not
authoritatively binding on us, yet being the judgment of able and learned Judges,
expounding laws based on principles derived from our own as well as the decisions of
English Courts, they are entitled to every respect and great weight, and I have found
them on many occasions very instructive and valuable. But, unfortunately, the decisions
cited to us as applicable to the question under discussion, are, as I have remarked, not
uniform, but very diverse. 179

Similarly, Chief Justice Draper of the Court of Error and Appeal
disregarded American challenge for cause practice. "I acknowledge, with
great satisfaction, the valuable aid I have frequently derived from the
decisions of eminent jurists who have presided in the American Courts,"
Draper C.J.A. asserted,
and in cases arising out of incidents and circumstances peculiar to a newly-settled country
like this Province, I have found help from their judgments which I could not obtain from
any English authorities. But on the questions now under our consideration, it has

177 Ibid. at 118 (C.A.).
178 Baker, supra note 133.
179 Whelan, supra note 176 at 69. (Q.B.)
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appeared to me, from the American cases at which I have looked, that their mode of
dealing with them differs from ours. 180

Chief Justice Draper thus chose not to make use of the American case
law on this issue.181
An 1876 New Brunswick case, R. v. Chasson,182 also
demonstrates the .reluctance to follow American challenge for cause
practices. Joseph Chasson, a Roman Catholic, was accused of an 1875
murder. A large number of citizens-150-were called for the jury pool.
The Crown used its ability to stand-aside jurors to remove any Catholics
from the pool. The defendant argued, first, that the Crown did not have
the right to stand-aside jurors, and, second, that the court should permit
him to question the jurors as to whether they had formed and expressed
an opinion as to the proper outcome of the case. Neither argument
proved successful.
The defendant issued a series of challenges for cause against
prospective jurors in voir dire. The resulting exchanges are evidence that
New Brunswick tolerated a greater level of jury questioning than in
England, but that the Edmonds requirement that a juror's opinion be
formed out of ill, will was still a requirement to demonstrate
challengeable partiality. For example, the defendant challenged Sylvanus
Payne on the ground that he did not stand indifferent. Payne testified in
voir dire that he had probably expressed an opinion about the case from
what he had read in newspapers, but that he had not expressed any
opinion as to what the outcome of trial ought to be, or of the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner. The defence counsel then attempted to ask
Payne whether, "if the result of the trial should agree with the opinion
he had formed as to it, that result, in his opinion, would be justice or
injustice."183 The judge refused to allow this question, and the triers
deemed Payne indifferent. The defence continued in its attempt to
inquire into the jurors' hostile opinions, but the judge refused to allow
such questioning. Thomas Hodnett, for instance, stated that he had
180

Ibid. at 138 (C.A.).

181 IbiL Whelan also hints that challenges were not common in Upper Canada prior to 1868.
One indication of this is simply the difficulty that the court had in deciding the case. The two appeal
judgments totalled 186 pages in length, the majority of which focused on the failure to allow the
challenge for cause. Chief Justice Hagarty also suggested that challenges were uncommon in Upper
Canada: "In this country we have had but little if any experience in such matters. I have no
recollection, during a connection of nearly thirty years with the Canadian Courts, of any question
concerning a challenge of jurors in criminal cases having arisen": ibid. at 143 (C.A.).
182 (1876) 16 N.B.R. 546 [hereinafter Chasson].
183 Ibi. at 548.
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previously formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
prisoner, but the trial judge rejected the defence counsel's question:
"'Did you not express an opinion that these prisoners ought all to be
hanged'?"1 8 4 The attorney general then questioned Hodnett, eliciting
testimony that he would decide on the evidence, and refuting the
suggestion that he had said the accused should be hanged or
punished.lSS Hodnett was found indifferent.
On appeal to the New Brunswick Supreme Court, the defendant
argued that he should have been permitted to question the jurors more
extensively regarding their partiality. The court found that no error had
occurred. The response of the Crown and reasoning of the bench suggest
a concern that American challenging for cause practices might creep
into Canadian courtrooms. The Crown, in fact, specifically commented
that this had already occurred to a limited extent in some Canadian
cases. There had been, according to the Crown, "few decisions in this
country" in which challenges had been at issue, but a "practice has
grown up, induced no doubt by the course of procedure in the United
States, and we have, to a certain extent, departed from the well settled
practice in England."18 6 The Crown warned that the challenge issue was
the most important aspect of the case, because
a practice has been growing up in our Courts, based upon the doctrines of some of the

American Courts and in violation of the settled doctrines of the English law. We contend
that opinions formed from knowledge of the cause, and in the absence of anything

denoting ill-feeling or affection, is not a ground for challenge.

18 7

The Court heeded the Crown's plea. Citing Frost,188 the court
found that the Crown could stand-aside jurors even if the jury pool was
much larger than usual. The bench similarly favoured the Crown's
position regarding what questions could be asked of jurors. Relying
exclusively on English jurisprudence, Chief Justice Allen noted that "Not
much authority is to be found as to the extent to which jurors can be
interrogated on challenges for unindifferency; but so far as the
authorities go, they are generally opposed to the contention of the
prisoner's counsel in this case."1 8 9 Chief Justice Allen, citing Edmonds,

184 Ibid
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concluded that defendants could not ask potential jurors whether they
possessed ill-will toward the accused because that would dishonour the
juror. The juror "cannot be interrogated as to matters which tend to his
own discredit, as, whether he has been convicted of felony, etc., nor, as it
seems, whether he has expressed a hostile opinion as to the guilt of the
defendant.'1 9 0 Justice Weldon took a similarly narrow view of jury
questioning during the voir dire.191 Justice Weldon followed English
precedent in requiring that the defence provide extrinsic evidence of a
juror's bias, and indicated that courts were to avoid American-style voir
dire examinations:
It is certainly not allowable from any decided cases that I can discover, that a juror has to
be subjected to a rigorous cross-examination, as was attempted by counsel for the
prisoner. Several cases were cited from the American Courts in favor of the course
pursued by the counsel for the prisoner, and, however highly such authorities are valued,
I am of the opinion it would not be desirable to extend the right of examining a juror
challenged further than is allowed in the English Courts, and that the mode of
examination is that hitherto allowed to a witness on his voirdire.192

2. Canada: conclusions
The evidence suggests that challenges for cause during the nineteenth
century were never as widespread and contentious in Canada as in the
United States. Several appellate level decisions indicate that Canadian
legal professionals were aware of American practices, but that Canadian
jurists appeared reluctant to draw upon this jurisprudence, choosing
instead to apply English doctrine. American influences did, however,
creep into Canadian statute law regarding peremptory challenges. The
colonies retained stand-asides, as in England, but in both New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia legislators gave the Crown the additional
advantage of peremptory challenges. At the same time, the number of
defence peremptories was generally decreased for serious offences,
though individuals charged with misdemeanours gained peremptory
challenges. The acts of the Dominion after 1867 incorporated these
trends in the statute law of the pre-Confederation colonies. In 1869, the
Dominion government consolidated the criminal acts of the provinces. 193
In doing so, the federal government adopted the number of peremptory
190 Ibid. at 580.
191 Ibid. at 586.
192 Ibid. at 587.
193 See An Act respectingProcedurein CriminalCases, and other matters relatingto Criminal
Law, 1869 (Can.), 32 & 33 Vict., c. 29, Preamble [hereineafter CriminalProcedure].
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challenges permitted defendants from the law of pre-Confederation
Upper Canada. The 1869 act provided for twenty defence peremptories
in treason or capital felonies, twelve in other felonies, and four in
misdemeanours.1 94 However, the Crown's right to four peremptories was
also included, seemingly as an insertion from the law of New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia. 195 These provisions remained the same in a 1886
Dominion criminal procedure act. 196 Six years later, the first Canadian
criminal code generally remained faithful to these earlier statutes,
though only defendants accused of non-capital felonies for which there
was a risk of more than five years of imprisonment were permitted
twelve, as opposed to four, peremptories. 197
There are at least four explanations that account for
developments in the law of challenges in Ontario, Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. First, Canadian courts' refusal to
follow American challenges for cause trends may reflect an adherence to
"British justice."198 Legal professionals in nineteenth-century Canada
clearly applied the eclectic form of legal analysis described by Blaine
Baker in some areas of the law. The acceptance of American
peremptory challenge rules demonstrated this approach. But, the
development of Canadian criminal law indicates the limits to which
nineteenth-century legal professionals would deviate from English
practices. Concerns about altering selection rules for one of the greatest
symbols of British justice-the jury-may therefore have overcome legal
pluralism in the case of challenges for cause doctrine.
Second, as the nineteenth century came to a close, there was a
broad movement in Canadian law toward English practices at the
expense of the more eclectic legal doctrines which had developed in the
colonies earlier in the century. For example, legislators incorporated
American peremptory challenge rules prior to this shift towards strictly
Eruglish forms of legal analysis. On the other hand, given that the
American law concerning challenges for cause was one of the most
obvious differences between American and English jury selection
procedures by the late 1860s, the fact that Canadian courts perceived the
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interrogation of jurors as an "American practice" is unsurprising. The
trend away from American law is substantiated by the 1890 case of Morin
v. R. in which the Supreme Court of Canada did not cite a single
precedent from the United States in its sixty-four page judgment
concerning stand-asides. 199
Third, Canadian legislators and courts likely followed English
precedents regarding challenges for cause and stand-asides out of a
desire to increase the state's control over the criminal justice system. As
in England, political reformers in Upper Canada often criticized
government officials for packing juries.2OO Canadian legal historians have
not yet satisfactorily assessed the accuracy of these claims, but the
existence of calls for jury reform suggest that the English doctrines
regarding challenges, particularly rules limiting opportunities to
challenge for cause and permitting stand-asides, assisted colonial
officials attempting to ensure convictions.
Lastly, as in England and the United States, the developments in
jury challenges can partly be explained in terms of trying to make jury
selection procedures more scientific. Paul Romney has commented on
the post-1850 Upper Canadian trend in which the reliability of juries was
questioned:
Juries were an affront to the rationalizing spirit of the age, with its emphasis on
establishing law as a science administered by trained professionals whose skilled
operations would achieve predictable results. As long as juries formed part of the judicial
process, law could be no more a science than bridge or poker, games in which even the
fullest mastery of principle still left the player subject to the uncertainty of the deal or the
luck of the draw.201

After the 1850 jury act Upper Canadian legal professionals attacked the
jury. "Forgotten was its reputedly age-old role as guardian of individual
liberty," Romney tells us, for suddenly "it was a medieval relic, costly
and inefficient, that continued to clog the machinery of justice only
through inertia of the public will."202 As in England and the United
States, legislators had two options to increase the perceived partiality of
199 [1890] S.C.R. 407.
200 See "State Trials," supra note 138 at 388-89; B. Wright, "The Gourlay Affair: Seditious
Libel and the Sedition Act in Upper Canada, 1818-19" in Greenwood & Wright, supra note 138, 487
at 490; P. Romney, "Upper Canada in the 1820s: Criminal Prosecution and the Case of Francis
Collins" in Greenwood & Wright, in Greenwood & Wright, supra note 138, 505 at 505; and P.
Romney, "From Constitutionalism to Legalism: Trial by Jury, Responsible Government, and the
Rule of Law in the Canadian Political Culture" (1989) 7 L. & Hist. Rev. 121 at 130-41.
201 Romney, supra note 139 at 291.
202

Ibid. at 296.
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the jury-they could hide bias, or increase the opportunities to expose
partiality. Given some of the social factors specific to British North
America, Canadian courts followed the English example and presumed
jurors' indifferency, rather than copy American attempts to weed out all
partial jurors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Critics have attacked both American and English practices concerning
challenges, stand-asides, and peremptory challenges. Lord Devlin, for
instance, criticized English doctrines, suggesting that the disappearance
of challenges for cause discouraged lawyers from closely examining who
sat on their clients' juries 03 E.P. Thompson also critiqued the English
system of challenges. "Our jury systems are like a tree with a strong
common trunk," argued Thompson, "but on one side a bough has been
lopped off, so that today only a vestigial challenge for cause is allowed to
the English defence, while on the other side is a flourishing American
branch, heavily laden with challenges on voir dire examinations." 204
However, for every critic of the English system, there is an equally vocal
critic of American practices. 205
The differing histories of challenges in Canada, the United
States, and England demonstrates how one small area of criminal
procedure has been an intersection point for both social and legal
trends. Challenges were an ancient tradition born in medieval England,
but the doctrine was never widely employed in English courts. After
1800 the doctrine of challenges became an important issue in two very
different environments. The post-Revolutionary United States was
concerned with using the jury as a bulwark against state oppression and,
thus, expanded the use of challenges for cause, while ending the
prosecutor's right to stand jurors aside. In England, on the other hand, a
concern with class unrest led the judiciary to limit challenges for cause
and expand stand-asides. Within these social contexts, changing
intellectual trends also had a role. The law was to be more scientific and
rationale, but the effect of this stream of thought was profoundly
203 Devlin, supra note 51 at 35-37.
204 "In Defence of the Jury," supra note 5 at 162. Also see N. Blake, "The Case for the Jury"

in M. Findlay and P. Duff, eds., The Jury UnderAttack (London: Butterworths, 1988) 140 at 154-60.
205 See A.W. Alschuler, "Our Faltering Jury" (1996) 122 Public Interest 28; and L. LoGiudice,
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Jury System" (1997) 7 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 617.
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different in England and the United States. In England, it encouraged
judges to make the challenging of jurors more difficult such that juries
would appear unbiased, while in the United States judges permitted
increased questioning of jurors to achieve the same end. The approach
in England was thus to not ask the juror about their bias and assume
there is no partiality; Americans assumed that the bias could be rooted
out, and therefore encouraged extensive questioning. In Canada, a
concern with making the law scientific was also important, as was the
influence of American ideas on Canadian peremptory challenge laws in
the mid-nineteenth century, and a subsequent attempt to remove
American influences from the law of challenges for cause.

